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ABSTRACT 
This paper discusses issues related to risk management, governance, and financing of public-
private partnerships transportation projects. The allocation of risks and the requirements for 
ownership and equity provision are examined through analysis of a range of contracts. Lesson 
learnt from a series of -private partnerships transportation projects are also 
presented. The results show that from the perspective of risk allocation, the arrangements are 
consistent among the projects. Some fluctuations, however, are observed in term of equity 
provision. Initially, the contracts are developed based on the private sector taking full traffic 
demand risk and promising outcomes led to revenue sharing clauses being introduced, later 
overoptimistic demand forecasts resulted in the market rejecting acceptance of traffic demand 
risk. The paper also presents the variation between the case study projects in terms of excess 
revenue sharing. The analysis also suggests that, in arranging these types of projects, traffic 
demand issue is prominent and should be given major concern since it is closely related with 
the revenue of the projects which in turns affect the equity of the projects.  
Keywords: Risk Management, Governance, Financing, Public-Private Partnerships, 
Transportation projects 
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INTRODUCTION 
Public Private Partnerships (PPP) are now an accepted mechanism for infrastructure provision 
in most countries.  The system of contracting was pioneered in France by using a Concession 
Model and was widely implemented in UK through Private Financing Initiative (PFI) (Grimsey 
& Lewis, 2005). Following UK, Australia, and then South Africa, Canada, Europe and now 
USA developed this type of contract to suit the local conditions. It is considered a mature 
delivery option in Australia (Eggers & Startup, 2007). The market maturity level is measured 
through the perspective of the public sector on how the PPPs contract is organized; 
commencing from the development of regulatory regime, establishment of special agency 
towards the refinement of the arrangement. 
This paper focuses on early  projects pre-Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC) 2007-2008, considering that this market sector is deemed to be the most 
mature market in Australia and counted for 25% of the total PPPs projects in Australia (Eggers 
& Startup, 2007). The discussions were based on the substance of the contracts acquired from 
the official government websites and related company websites. The limitation this paper is 
that most of the contracts are in the form of contract summaries, not the original contracts.  
The main discussion topics in this paper are categorized into three major parts: risk allocation, 
equity arrangements, and revenue/payment arrangements. Critical appraisal and constructive 
dialogue was used to analyze the contractual arrangement of the case study projects.  
LITERATURE DISCUSSIONS 
Governance of PPP Projects  
Governance issues in PPP projects are influenced by many factors. Grimsey and Lewis (2004) 
suggest that PPPs use contract management and reporting systems as a basis for governance. 
Their framework focuses on risk management and the specific involvement of government. 
Devapriya (2006) discussed the influence of the financing arrangements on governance of PPP 
projects and detailed that this in turn influences the effectiveness of the performance of parties 
involved in the concession. In addition, Reijners (1994) through his investigation in 
Netherlands PPP projects found that the governance structure should be sophisticated enough 
to accommodate the conflicting interest of parties involved in order to avoid a breakdown of 
the trust necessary in PPPs. Another issue that closely relates to the governance of PPPs is that 
of the The complexity of these long-term contracts means it is generally 
impossible to specify all potential outcomes in the contract documents and specification. 
Consequently, not all of the performance obligation of parties involved in the arrangement can 
be specifically defined in the contract which in turn adds the complexity of the contractual 
relationships that requires ongoing management of change and adjustment events. A typical 
governance structure is presented in the following Figure 1.  In Malaysia, the general form of 
PPP project following a structure presented in Figure 2.    
The basic foundation of PPPs is an optimal allocation of the risks between public and private 
sectors (HM treasury UK, 2007; Partnerships Victoria, 2007). Different parties have different 
perspective and interest on risks. This has been clearly shown by study of Grimsey and Lewis 
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(2002) on the waste water treatment facility in Scotland that sound management of the 
conflicting issues or interests of parties on risks played an important role in the success of the 
project. However, this such arrangements are hard to replicate. Not only may the risk allocation 
be confronted with complexity and unpredictability in term of financial consequences but it 
also has to be in line with the demands of important stakeholders and the community (Ng & 
Loosemore, 2006). The willingness of parties to bear the risks should they materialize is a key 
factor in optimization of the original risk allocation and is reflected in the amount of rate 
charged by doing so (Ward et al., 1991). And this, according to Ward et.al (1991) can only be 
achieved through robust and reliable risk management process. 
In terms of financing arrangement of the PPPs, the issue of bundling or unbundling a range of 
sub-projects in the contract is also highlighted as a complexity in governance arrangements. 
Devapriya (2006) strongly argued that the governance of PPP is highly influence by the debt 
and equity structure. Further, when it is closely linked with the management of the project, it 
would likely bring about a negative effect to the success of the project. This argument supports 
the previous findings by Trujillo et al. (1998) through their analysis of BOT projects that the 
aspect of project 
such as construction and operation will likely to create a better end result.  
Figure 1: Typical PPP structure  
(Source: Beenhakker, 1997 cited in Akintoye et.al., 2003) 
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Figure 2: Typical PPP structure adopted in Malaysia 
(Source: UKAS, 2016) 
Another issue with regard to governance of PPP projects is whether governance of the projects 
should follow project or corporate governance.  Wilson et al. (2010) had conducted an 
traditional projects and PPPs is significantly different due to the involvement of many parties 
in the project arrangement. They further argue that a term of project governance, which can be 
seen as a joint between project management and corporate governance, could be more suitable 
for the arrangement. However; considering the long lifespan of projects, multiple party 
involvement and social responsibility as consequence of longer contracting period, PPP 
governance is closer to corporate governance type (Wilson et al., 2010).    
Good governance of PPP projects  
When the governance issue plays an important role for the success of the project, good 
governance principle becomes a concern. This condition exists when two or more parties 
involve in and have interest in the certain type of cooperation. Abednego and Ogunlana (2006), 
through their research in the PPP projects in Indonesia, argued that governance issue plays an 
important role in the success of PPP project since this type of project requires great strategic 
concern due to their long-term relationships nature. The success of the project is not only 
measured through short-term objectives such as on budget, on time and at the appropriate 
quality but also needs to consider a long term cost of operation and maintenance. This will raise 
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trust, good tendering system, proper information dissemination and communication system, 
& Ogunlana, 2006). In this case, it is further 
suggested that project management should implement good corporate governance principles in 
the project. 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has develop a Principles 
of Corporate Governance in their effort of building a better and reliable governance practice in 
OECD as well as non-OECD member countries  (OECD, 2004). Even though that the 
principles are aimed at assisting mainly publicly traded companies, however with some 
adjustments; the principles can also be implemented in the privately owned companies (OECD, 
2004). The Principles of Corporate Governance consists of six main principles, which are: 
ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance framework, the right of shareholders 
and key ownerships functions, equitable treatment of shareholders, the role of stakeholder in 
corporate governance, disclosure and transparency, and the responsibility of the Board (OECD, 
2004).  
It can be inferred that the good corporate governance mainly emphasizes on the protection and 
equal treatment for all stakeholders. Since the participants of the public Private Partnerships 
projects consist of different parties with different level of ownerships and due to a long term 
nature of relationships in the project, it is very reasonable to include good corporate governance 
principles in the practice of project management in public private partnerships projects. 
Financing in PPP Projects 
Apart from the recourse and non-recourse issue, project financing definition is recently moving 
towards a focus on the repayment of the debt/loan through looking initially to the cash flows 
and revenue of the project (Nevit & Fabozzi, 1995). The main purpose of arranging project 
financing is to provide a borrowing for the project in exposure of profit while the balance sheet 
of the sponsor is not affected, completely non-recourse and/or as little recourse as possible. In 
addition to the refunds generation from the cash flow, project financing is emphasized on the 
separation of the project entity from the entity of  and 
 (Finnerty, 1996).  
Risks phases also influence the arrangement of project financing. Commonly for a green or 
new development project, there are three phases of risks which relate to the financing 
arrangement: engineering and construction phase, start-up phase and operation phase (Nevitt 
& Fabozzi, 1995; Tinsley, 2000; Grimsey & Lewis, 2002). Each phases has its own unique 
nature which consequently influence the selection by the lenders. In many instance, different 
risks phases or periods have different lenders (Nevitt & Fabozzi, 1995). Therefore, the risks 
profile of the project will later influence the financing arrangement.  
The sources of financing are mainly a combination of debt and equity. The structure of the debt 
and equity arrangement in PPP projects is directly associated with the governance of the project 
(Devapriya, 2006). The sponsor of the project will likely to take the largest portion of the 
equity, which later can be offered to the purchaser, and the recent trend is that the equity is sold 
in the capital market (Finnerty, 1996). Besides as a control mechanism, equity also represents 
a whole life ownerships interest on the entity of the project.  However, one feature of equity is 
that there is no requirement of the project to pay the return at the specific time to the equity 
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holders (Marks et al., 2005). These features will influence the decision of the companies 
involved in the PPP contracts whether to take part or not in the equity stand. There are some 
factors dictate on which parties should take an equity stand (Finnerty, 1996). First, the provider 
takes liability when the cost overrun occurs. Second; in the longer construction period, the 
provider must be willing to defer their dividends payment. And the final factor is that the equity 
provider must be parties which will likely to get the most profit from the project. Considering 
those factors, the equity providers could be one of these parties i.e. the purchaser of the product, 
the owner of the resources, and the suppliers of products and services. The public/commercial 
equity investors are likely to invest at the latter stage of the project lifecycle, or at least after 
the construction period is passed (Finnerty, 1996).   
In PPP projects, rarely that equity will covers all of the investment on the project. In fact, the 
biggest portion comes from debts. Debts can be acquired from the commercial banks in the 
form of long term loan or can be from other sources such as from bilateral agencies/ export 
credit agencies (ECAs) and multilateral agencies/MLAs (e.g. World Bank, IBRD, ADB, IFC, 
etc.; and the last option is from the capital markets (Tinsley, 2000).   
Another option for investment of the PPP project is from a financing device that having both 
features of debt and equity or debt/equity hybrid. Debt/equity hybrid can be described as a 
capital raising device which has both features of debt and equity (HM Treasury, 2007). Some 
examples of the those hybrid mechanism are certain classes preference shares, convertible 
notes, capital protected equity loans, profit participating loans, perpetual debt, endowment 
warrants and equity swaps. The mechanisms are highly influenced by the taxation regime 
which affecting the choice and financial arrangement of the financing scheme of the PPPs 
project.   
Project Risks Allocation Principles 
Appropriate risks allocation plays an important role in the success of the PPPs project and 
considered to be the impediment in the PPP arrangement due to varying and uncertain risks 
faced by the PPPs project. Apart from the technical risks, risks that arise from the stakeholders 
are more complex and difficult to control (Ng & Loosemore, 2007). Hence, the risks allocation 
is the major concern in the arrangement of PPP contracts.  
In term of risks, the toll road/transport project has a greater risk than other sector, leading to 
the modest growth of the private financing involvement in transport sector (Fisher & Babbar, 
2000). Apart from the economic, construction and operation risks; the risks resulting from co-
ordination issue with the regional government or planning agencies is also crucial in the 
transport projects (Haley, 1992). Therefore, these risks require a systematic risk allocation 
between the public and its private counterpart through an active involvement of public, 
government agencies, and private parties. 
In enabling to transfer risk effectively, the arrangement should consider the main risk allocation 
principles the bearers should be able to manage the risk outcome and the risks are allocated to 
the parties which best able to manage those at the lowest expenses (Medda, 2006).  
The complex arrangement in PPP project especially revolve around two main partners, SPV 
and the procurer, is adding to the complicity of risk allocations. Demirag et al. (2010) through 
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their research in Scotland argued that due to this complexity, in some cases, the risks may be 
transferred to parties who are not able to control or not willing to bear them. In this case, those 
parties will seek other mechanisms as compensation or in attempt to avoid greater lost, such as 
using hedges, swaps and insurance.  
Hovy (2015) also argued that the risk allocation is the main challenge in arranging the PPP 
projects. Two practices commonly opted, which are transferring risks to private sector leads to 
higher premium cost and leaving the risks to the public sector that is better to cope the risks 
cause reduction in value for money objectives, are in contradiction to the optimal risks 
allocation principles. He further argued that unforeseen risks also become the hindrance in 
achieving PPP projects success. This is because the long term nature of PPP projects which 
could reach 30-40 years of contract duration. It is difficult to forecast risks in advance and 
during the contract period due to the dynamic changes in many aspects such as economic and 
politics aspects.  
Revenue and Payment Arrangement 
One of ultimate risks in PPP transportation project is the surety of revenue stream in 
compensating the investment (Grimsey & Lewis, 2002) which closely related with an accurate 
traffic demand forecasting (Eggers & Startup, 2007).  The inaccuracy of this forecasting at the 
initial phase will result in numerous re-negotiation during the contract period that hinder and 
undermine the benefit of the private financing in involvements in the transportation projects 
(Guash, 2004). Hence, the contract should clearly stipulate this risk which incorporate also the 
sharing arrangement of potential excess of the revenue from the materialization of traffic that 
is higher than the base case scenario.  
 Developing the legal and structured concession environment is one of the prerequisite when 
attempting to implement this financing arrangement (Fisher & Babbar, 2000). As matter of 
fact, the concessionaire is likely required to pay more attention on this matter particularly at 
the project initiation stage to ensure that the contract accommodates the future uncertainty due 
to its long term nature and to minimize the re-negotiation. One of the solution is to conduct 
intense discussions in more detail with the counterpart in this case is the government or the 
related agency at the initial stage of the project.  
Some supporting arguments with respect to the importance of pre-negotiation of this aspect has 
been presented by some research. For the project which has higher uncertainty in forecasting 
in the revenue stream at the initial stage; the public sector (government) should bear most of 
the risks or alternatively willing to compensate the private counterpart when there is a non-
materialization of the forecasted revenue (Ng & Loosemore, 2007; Eggers & Startup, 2007). 
The main reason is because the certainty of long term revenue stream is esential for the 
achievement of value for money as one of the attributes of successful PPP projects (Grimsey 
& Lewis, 2002). Another alternative is by choosing a revenue mechanism whether it is market-
tied or contract-tied mechanism (Haley, 1992). This can be then related to the nature of the 
service provided by project whether it is directly or not affecting the users.   
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METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this paper is a desktop study of a theoretical examination through 
contracts analysis.  The contract data is acquired from the electronic resources of the official 
government agencies or departments and the companies involved in the PPP schemes. The 
limitation of this research is that even though the contract is obtained from the official websites, 
most of the contracts are in the form of contract summary published by the government 
agencies or companies.    
Five contracts data were analyzed from the perspective of equity arrangement, risk allocation 
and revenue /payment arrangement. The case study focus on the transport PPPs projects in 
Australia consists of  Eastlink project (Victoria), Southern Cross Station (Victoria), Chatswood 
Transport Interchange (New South Wales), Sydney Cross City Tunnel (New South Wales), 
Westlink M7/ Western Sydney Orbital (New South Wales), and Lane Cove Tunnel (New South 
Wales). 
The data were analyzed using the preceding theoretical framework and literature discussions. 
The analysis focuses on the equity/investment arrangement, risks allocation, and 
reward/concession arrangement especially regarding the arrangement of excess revenue. The 
expected outcome are identification of sensitive issues underlying the early PPPs transport 
project in Australia pre-GFC and measurement of the consistency level of the contractual 
arrangement in the transportation sector. 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS 
The common risks in infrastructure project by Grimsey and Lewis (2002) are used as a platform 
in analyzing the risks allocation. The aim is to examine the allocation of major risks in 
s PPPs transportation projects, to determine whether the allocation is consistent from 
project to project and to identify a specific risks that require special attention. The following 
Table 1 presents the risks allocation of the case study projects under 
In term of major risks allocation, the contracts shows that there has been a consistent type of 
risks are transferred to the private sector (i.e. technical/design risk, construction risk, operating 
risk, revenue risk, financial risk, and regulatory/political risk). Other risks are shared between 
the private and public sector (i.e. force majeure risk, environmental risk, and project default 
risk. Thus, this means that the transportation sector is considered to be a mature market of PPPs 
in term of risks allocation.  
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Table 1: Major risks allocation 
* Public sector has an obligation to support inflow traffic, different project has different 
arrangement. 
In Australia, in general, both parties (public and private sectors) have a right to terminate the 
contract when one of them found to breach the contract. However, in some cases, the 
discretion.  
In regard to the revenue risk of toll and tunnel PPPs projects, even though that a risk is  borne 
by the private sector, there is a special clause which requires the public sector to support the 
private counterpart, especially related to the input traffic. The following Table 2 shows the 
special involvement of the public sector in the input traffic arrangement.      
Risks 
Risk arrangement for PPP Projects 
Southern Cross 
Station 
Redevelopment  
Sydney 
Cross City 
Tunnel  
Westlink M7 
Motorways 
Lane Cove 
Tunnel  
Eastlink  
Technical / Design 
Risk 
Construction risk 
Operating Risk 
Financial risk 
Regulatory/political 
risks 
Private 
Revenue Risk 
Private Private* Private* Private* Private 
Force majeure risk 
Environmental risk  Shared 
Project Default risk Public Shared Shared Shared Shared 
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Table 2: Traffic risk arrangement  
Project Traffic risk arrangement 
Sydney Cross City Tunnel 
(June 2003) 
The traffic risk is transferred to the private sector. 
The contract/project deed requires the Road and Traffic Authorities 
(RTA), the trustee and the company to build traffic arrangement 
which must be 
to ensure that the minimum the traffic inflow to the tunnel as required 
by the economic base model is achieved. An alternative in accordance 
with this clause is to close and merge some of the existing traffic 
network. 
The project deed also introduces clause 3.5 (Renegotiation provision) 
in regard to closing or reduction in traffic inflow to the tunnel. 
Westlink M7 Motorways 
(August 2003) 
The traffic risk is transferred to the private sector. 
Even though that the traffic risk is transferred to the private sector and 
the RTA or New South Wales (NSW) government has a right to build 
any type of road network, the project deed stipulates that 50 traffic 
connections to the M7 Motorway will not be diminished nor lessen. 
The project deed also introduces a clause 3.5 (Renegotiation 
Lane Cove Tunnel 
(July 2004) 
The traffic risk is transferred to the private sector 
and utility service development right and 
existing tollways or freeways. However, the project deed stipulates 
that 12 traffic connections to the motorway will not be diminished nor 
lessen. 
The project deed also introduces a clause 3.5 (Renegotiation 
provision) in regard to the specific road sections.  
Eastlink 
(November 2004) 
In general, the traffic risk is transferred to the private sector. 
However, the state has an obligation under the contract to provide 
A failure to provide this support is considered to be a breach to the 
contract. In regard to this failure, the contract introduces clause 45 
(Key Risk Management Regime). According to this clause, there are 
pursuance to expert determination (Clause 73 Expert Determination) 
Equity Arrangement 
The Equity distribution of the PPPs transportation projects in Australia is presented in the 
following Figure 3.   
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Figure 3: Equity distribution of PPPs transportation projects 
The chart shows the fluctuation of equity stake by the parties involved in PPP transportation 
projects under study that the financial closing of the contract between year 2002-2004. Initially 
the financiers took the lead by accepting 100% of the equity. Following that, role of the 
financiers is reduced since other equity providers were starting to play their role in providing 
equity. Those include superannuation and financial firms. At the latter stage, the equity 
role is only as the Initial Public Offering (IPO) underwriter of the shares and accept only minor 
sum of deferred equity, for example in Eastlink project. However, the role of the financiers as 
a leader of the PPPs transport arrangement remains unchanged.  in the equity 
stake is relatively constant at the level of ± 20%. In some cases, the equity, ± 20%, is shared 
by two companies, either from one parent company or divided equally by two separate 
constructor such as in Westlink M7 project. There are two for
in the equity provision : initial equity investors (i.e. 
Sydney Cross City Tunnel and Westlink M7 Motorways) and deferred equity investors (i.e. in 
Lane Cove Tunnel and Eastlink).  
also changed from initial equity 
investor toward the deferred equity provider. Even though that the type of involvement is 
changed from initial equity provider to deferred equity provider, the total investment of 
contractor remains constant at the level of ± 20% of equity. 
Revenue and Payment Arrangement  
In general, there are two types of revenue arrangement in the PPPs transportation projects in 
Australia i.e. service payment and tolling system. The difference is due to the nature of the 
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service provided. Service payment is applied on terminal building provision (Southern Cross 
station redevelopment) while the tolling system is applied in the toll road or tunneling projects. 
The summary of the revenue and payment arrangement of the PPPs transportation projects in 
Australia is presented in the following Table 3. 
There are some findings derived from Table 3 as follows: 
For the all the toll road projects, the revenue are collected from the users by using 
the transponder. Some contracts require the system must be able to recognize the non-
transponder equipped vehicle.  
Some differences were observed in terms their excess revenue arrangement.  
company/trustee in the project deed, the government has a right for a share of the 
exceeding revenue. For tunnel project (i.e. Sydney Cross City Tunnel & Lane Cove 
Tunnel), the arrangement were similar (Figure 5). For toll road projects, each of them 
has its own specific arrangement. In M7 Motorway project, the excess sharing is similar 
throughout the contract period (Figure 4). While for the Eastlink project, the contract 
period is divided into some periods with its own excess sharing arrangement (Figure 
6). This implies that there was an optimist projection that revenue from the PPPs 
transport project would exceed the base economic model proposed by the 
company/trustee. That could be seen also as opportunity from the perspective of the 
public sector to be actively involved in arranging the transport network to ensure the 
traffic inflow exceeding the proposed model. 
Since the biggest risk of PPPs transportation project is revenue risk, the private sector 
will likely to be cautious in regard to the surety of traffic inflow. The public 
sector/government involvement is still required to ensure that the traffic network is 
properly arranged. 
Another important issue in regard to the traffic arrangement is the main stakeholder 
interest, the public/the users. Prior to implement certain traffic network arrangement 
(such as merging, closing, widening, etc.) in the contract, both parties have to consider 
the resistance of public on the arrangement. This resistant will significantly influence 
the revenue for the private sector and the image of the project which in turn give a bad 
effect to the project success.  
Since the PPPs contract is normally for more than 20 years, it is imperative that the 
arrangement is discussed in detail before the contract effected in order to avoid dispute 
and prolonged renegotiation. 
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Table 3: Revenue and payment arrangement  
No. Projects Revenue 
Re-payment to the Government 
Land Lease Excess Revenue 
1. 
Southern Cross Station 
Redevelopment (July 
2002) 
Service payment  
paid quarterly of a 
year 
None None 
2. 
Sydney Cross City 
Tunnel (June 2003) 
Toll 
$1, plus 
35% share of 
Gross revenue 
from no-toll 
business 
Progressive increased 
share for excess more 
every period 
3. 
Westlink M7 Motorways 
(August 2003) 
Toll 
$1, plus 
A share of Gross 
revenue from 
no-toll business. 
Progressive increased 
share for excess more 
than 5% of the 
years of completion 
stage 1 of the project. 
4. 
Lane Cove Tunnel (July 
2004) 
Toll 
$1, plus 
A share of Gross 
revenue from 
no-toll business. 
Progressive increased 
share for excess more 
than 10% of the base 
case financial model 
every period. 
5. 
Eastlink (November 
2004) 
Toll 
$ 20 Million 
Freeway leases and 
land licenses 
Progressive increase in 
share of excess revenue 
varied periods. 
Figure 4: Shared Excess Revenue for Eastlink 
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Figure 5: Shared excess revenue for cross city tunnel & lane cove tunnel 
Figure 6: Sharing excess revenue for Westlink M7 motorway 
Latest Progress and Information on the Case Study Projects 
From the five case study projects, three of them (i.e. Sydney Cross City Tunnel, Lane Cove 
Tunnel, and Eastlink) had faced commercial burden. The main reason is because the highest 
FGIC 1st Conference on Governance & Integrity, 2017  
3  4 April 2017, Yayasan Pahang, Kuantan, Malaysia 
ISBN 978-967-2054-37-5 
392 
risks which is the demand risk is materialized that in all cases the projected traffic demand is 
not achieved. The worst case is experienced by the Sydney Cross City Tunnel that asset has to 
be sold to other investor. Clearly evident that traffic demand is a crucial risk that failing to meet 
the projected traffic flow will affect the revenue which eventually influence the equity.  
Duffield (2010) where two projects were highlighted: the CityLink and Southern Cross Station 
projects (both in state of Victoria). In CityLink Project, most risks including construction, 
design, operation, financing and market risk, are transferred the private sector. In this CityLink 
project, a bank which is Macquarie Bank via its Infrastructure Investment Group, took the lead 
in the financial and project arrangement. The Southern Cross Station Project is an upgrading 
project of an existing railway station. A similar risks arrangement was observed. The biggest 
risk in this project is borne to the private sector which is the operational of the existing station 
risk that the private sector must ensure that the station remains operational during upgrading 
work. In terms of financing, ABN Amro leads the arrangement by contracting Leighton 
Contractors, Honeywell and Delaware North Australia to deliver and operate the development, 
via SPV named Civic Nexus (DTF Victoria 2016). These two transportations projects again 
highlight the major involvement of banks (financial sector) as the leader or the biggest equity 
taker in the arrangement. A recent study by Carbonara et al. (2015) in the study of motorway 
PPP projects in Europe had identified five major risks: construction risks, revenue, financial 
risks, force majeure risks, and regulatory/political risks. Similar with the finding of the 
presented paper, the research by Carbonara et al. (2015) also indicate that the most critical risks 
in PPP motorway projects demand or usage risk which is correspond to the revenue risks that 
occurs during the operation phase. Further, he also suggestion for a kind of risk sharing between 
private and public sector with regards to this risk through revenue sharing mechanism and 
revenue distribution mechanism. This recent finding confirms the findings that are presented 
in this paper.  
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
From the perspective of equity arrangement, risk allocation and revenue/payment arrangement, 
the PPPs transportation project in Australia experiences a consistent arrangement which shows 
the maturity of this market sector. Inconsistency is observed only on the initial equity provision 
where the amount of financier percentage is reduced. However, the role of the financier remains 
unchanged as the leader of the project entity. In term of risk; in transport projects, the most 
sensitive issue that has been given most concern by the contracts is the revenue or traffic 
arrangement risk. 
There are some recommendations for further research extended by this report, as follow: 
In regard to the PPPs transportation project, a deeper research should be conducted in order 
to find out the motivation of parties behind the willingness to put equity on the project. 
Firstly, from the contractor point of view whether the willingness is motivated by 
ownership interest, controlling interest, or just an obligation to show a commitment to the 
success of the project. Secondly, from the point of view of financiers, the focused is on the 
motivation to bear whole equity of the project or to share it with others. 
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Another research needs to be conducted is to find out whether the excess revenue is 
experienced by the PPPs project and to find the effectiveness of the excess sharing revenue 
arrangement. This is important to ensure a fair arrangement is achieved, since the private 
sectors bear the revenue risk and whether this can be considered as an opportunity of both 
parties. 
The same research should also be conducted in other PPPs  sectors. The purposes are to 
find whether the consistency of the arrangement has been achieved, to investigate the 
maturity of the market, and to obtain unique features of PPPs arrangement in other sectors 
compared with transportation projects. Thus, the most sensitive issue which could likely to 
create a dispute can be identified. 
The main objective of PPPs contract is to achieve value for money. Since the PPPs contract 
period is relatively long (more than 25 years), there should be an empirical method 
suggested on measuring whether the project has successfully deliver value for money. 
Thus, the lesson learnt can be immediately implemented on the foregoing project. 
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